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PARLEY D. BILLS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v".- h 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD CO~i-
p ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant amd Re,spondent, 
ll ED 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBJDRTS & BLACK 
Counsel for Appellant 
530 .Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
PETITION FOR REHEARING _____ -----···········---·-----------------------· 1 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING .. --------------------------·············· -----------------···· 3 
POINT I. THIS COURT HAS ERRONEOCSLY CON-
CLUDED THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGE~T IN 
NOT AVOIDING THE SECOND STOP.·····--- 3 
POINT II. THIS COURT HAS ERRONEO"CSLY MISC0:--.1-
CEIVED ·THE MEANING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 25, 
AND LABORING l:'::-->rDER SUCH JVIISCONCEPTION 
HAS INCORRECTLY HELD THAT SAID INSTRUC-
TION WAS PROPER..-·------------------------------------------------········ 6 
POINT III. 'THIS COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY MIS-
CONCEIVED THE MEANING OF INSTRUCTION 
~~riiot~~i~~gt~~~c~~~E~~gcJIH~Js~~fr) 
INSTRUCTION WAS PROPER. ___________________________ -----··--·-·- 7 
CONCLUSION 9 
CASES CI"TED 
Ayres v. The Cnion Pacific Railroad Company, 111 L'tah 104, 
176 P. 2d 161 ---------··· ---····----············· --·-···--·- ------··-- 10 
Morrison v. Perry, 140 P. 2d 772 ---------------------------------------····--···· 4 
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 77 S. Ct. 443, 352 US 500 _____ 10 
Sorenson et al. v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 Pac. 72 ..................... __ . 4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARLEY D. BILLS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
T! II·; DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
"\VJ<JS'1'1£.RN RAJLROAD C031-
p ~\.NY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I 
·, Case No. 9028 
{ 
\ 
' 
P~JTITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF IX SUPPORT THEREOF 
PE'l'I'l'ION FOR REHJ:o:JARING 
cm,fES XOIY Parley ll. Bills, appellant herein, and 
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehear-
ing in the above cnlitlcd case and to vacate the Order 
of the Court herein affirming the judgment for respnnd-
ent. This petition is based on the following grounds: 
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POINT I 
Thi~ Court ha.~ erroneously conrluded that the trial 
court properly submitted to the jury the issue of whether 
defendant -..vas negligent in not avoiding the second stop. 
POINT II 
This Court has erroncou~l; mi~(·oneeivcd the mean-
ing of lmtruction Ko. 25, and la!JOring under fmch rills-
conception has inconectly held that said instruction was 
proper. 
POIKT III 
This Court has erroneously misconceiwd the mean-
ing of Instruction No. 19, and Jahoring under such mis-
r:onccption has incorrectly held that said instruction was 
proper. 
RA \H,lXGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BL.\CK, 
Counsel for .\.ppellant 
530 ,Judge Building 
Salt Lake {jity, Ptah 
l hereby ('(•rtil·~- thnt l am ont' of the attorneys for 
th•· np]H'linnt. pditilllll'r lwrein, ru•d that in m~- opinion 
tllNP i>< 1-'ood ran.~\' to believe the judgment objected to is 
\'rt'OllC'0\1>< and that the ca~e ougllt to be re-e:xamined as 
Pl'n.'"('\l for in ~aid petition. 
DATI<;]) Jul_,. \.6, 1960. 
\L\. Y\TE L. 1-lLAC'K 
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BRIEF lS SUPPORT OF APPELLJ\\1"S 
J-'J:J'l'J'L' I_ON FOU HEHEARI~G 
POINT L 
THIS CO"CRT HAS ERRONEOUSLY ,CQ~CLUDED THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFE:-rDANT WAS NEG-
LlGE::-:!T IN NOT AVOIDING THE SECOND S'TOP. 
'l'his Cnurl has reeog':ized the proposi!ior1 that plain-
tiff wa~ entitled to go to the jury on the i:>we of whetlJPr 
the railroad waf' negligent in not avoiding the seeond 
stop which resulted in plaintiff's injury. We 'JUOtR the 
following language from the Opinion: 
"At the trial appellant claimed that rc~pond­
ent was negligent became the engineer ~tovped 
the train in a manner which ,subjected the caboose 
to an unusually violent jerk, which could have heen 
avoided had a proper slop been made, and [/,or 
it u;as also negl£gent in not nsing the method oj 
switching u;hich wo•dd hrwe avoirled the second 
stop altogether." 
At a later paint in the opinion this Court, rererring 
to lnstruetion No. 12, stated: 
"This instruction covered appellant's theorif';:: 
of what respondent's negligence consi~ted. Since 
the jury brought in a verdict of 'no cause of ac-
tion• it must have found t.hat re:-;pondPnt had not 
aeted negligently in either of these particulars, 
and that in the stopping and manner of stopping, 
ordinary, reasonable care had been exercised." 
\Ye make no contention that Instruction Ko. 12 re-
quested by plaintiff was improper. Instruction ~o. 12 
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Ill fact .~ubmitted the i;:;;:;ucs above enumerated to the 
,jury. However, it has htcn long and ·well established 
law in the State of Utal1 that where two instructions are 
in conflict onf' with the otl1er, and one instruction is 
erroneous, reversible error exists. 
See Sorenson el al. r. Bl'!l, 5] Utah :2G2, 170 Pac. 
72, where the court ,;tated: 
"At most it would merely present a rase 
where two instructions were given upon the same 
subject, one proper and the other improper. 
"\Vhere such is the (·a~e. and the eYidence i~ con-
flicting upon the subject covered by the instrur-
tions, or i~ such that more than one conclusion 
i~ penni~~ible, and the record leaves it in doubt 
whether the jury followed the in~t111rlion that 
is proper or the one that i~ impro-per, then hut one 
result i~ legall;- permissible in this court, and that 
is to reverse the judgment and grant a new trial to 
tl1e aggrieved party. The district court no doubt 
had in mind torrcct principle;: of la,,- 1rhen it 
framed the instruction. but in stating those princi-
ple.;, it m;ed language 1d1ich CR~t a burden on 
l'laintiff~ w!1ich the law dot>~ not rerprire of thmn. 
'J'il1• in,..trurtion is thereforP cleari:- erroneous." 
Kr(' abo, J!orri.,·o!l r. Pen.'!. 140 P. ~d 77:?. where the 
court ~tutt·d: 
'"In other in><truetions the court stated in 
~uhstance that a per,;on who dro>e an automobile 
in the manner de"cribed in tlw propounded qu<'~­
t.ions wn~ ll('giigt•nt, and in Instruction ='lo. 1~ 
in~truch-d 1rith re~1wd to an emergency alle~dly 
l'rPated !J_,, the deceased. The jur:· WH8 told that 
if a per~ on drove hi,; ear il1 a. certain manner he 
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1WS negligent, and also that if he drove his car 
in that manner they were then to determine 
whether or not he ·was negligent. 1'hus the jury 
was permitted to dt>cide that acts of negligence 
as a matter of lav,t were not negligent. 'I'hese in-
structiom; were confliding and the giving of such 
instructions constitutes error. Sorenson v. Bell, 
51 Utah ::!6:.l, 170 P. 72." 
In its Instruction :\ o. ~() the trial court stated: 
"l:k:fore you can find the Railroad negligent, 
you must find by a prepondcranrc of the cvidcnee 
that the engineer· failed lo make an ordinar~·, 
normal and rea::>orJable ~top when he acted rJn the 
siq-,ud of the brakeman Serassio." 
It i~ obvious that Insirnrtion Xo.12 and lmtruetion 
1To. 20 are incompat.iblc and inconsistent. Instrudior. No. 
12 authorizes tlw jury to find Lhe defendant negligent 
"in ~topping the train.'' Tnst.ruetion )J"o. 20 requin~s that 
before the railroad can be found nRgli.genL the nwt1flfr 
of stopping l.he train must lmve been negligent . .Absent 
Instruction Xo. 20 and Instruction Ko. 23, which contains 
the same erronf'OllS proposition that the !tl(!ltuer in which 
the enginef'r operated the train rnust have been negligent 
bRfore the plaintiff could reeover, '"'e ·would have no com-
plaint. Instruction No. 12 properly stated the law. But 
Inshuction No. 12 and Jnstmction 1\o. 20 are incom-
patible in that the one allowo: the :jury to find the railroad 
negligent for making the siap at all m1d the other re-
ljnires that before the railroad can be found negligent 
the manner in which the stop tt'v.B made rwust have been 
negl1:gent. The erroneouf'. imtrurtion may very well have 
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been the on(' followed by the jury and the correct instruc-
tion ignored. Under 8ueh circumstances it is our position 
that this Court i,; clearly in error where it states "~ince 
the jury brought in a verdiel of no cause of action it must 
have found that respondent had no1 acted negligently in 
either of these particulars"'"''"'. 
POINT II. 
THIS COCRT HAS ERRONEOUSLY MISCONCEIVED 
THE )iEANING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 26, A:\D LABOR-
ING UNDER SUCH MISCONCEPTION HAS INCORRECTLY 
HELD THAT SAID INSTRUCTION WAS PROPER. 
The misconception by this Court ot the true meaning 
of Instruction No. 25 is contained in the follovring state-
ment: 
"Appellant contends that the court committed 
prejudicial error by giving an instruction such 
as the requirement1> of a safety rule of respondent 
that employees should e.rerci.>r reusmw..ble care 
against injury from jerks or sUu:k action or any 
other u ne.rpected motion b~- keeping a secure grip 
and foothold when riding on moving equipment, 
" . . " 
Instruction X" o. :!3 actually read~ as follov.'S: 
"Plai·nl·if/ in the exerti~'e of rrasonable care 
~~~ required by the safdp rules of the Denver & 
Rio Grande TVe.-tem Roil roa-d Compa.n.t~ to protect 
himself again.~t in.iury a.> for as possible from 
Jerks, .'dock actiOII, or any other ·unexpected mo-
tion " • • .'' 
1'here is a vn~t differt'Jl('C betwC'en the requirement 
that a plnintiff t'.rrrcisc n'asonol!le care to gua.rd against 
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unexpected jerks and t11e re(jnirement as a matte-r of law 
that in the exercise of reaso1~able care he nw.st guard 
against twexpected jerks. In the former he is required 
to exercise reasonable care. In the latter he is required 
as a matter of law to guard againd unexpected jer·ks. 
The latter is an improper instruction. '.l'he misquote by 
this Court clearly indicates a misconception of the mean-
ing of lnstrudion :;...'o. :2J. Correctly analy~cd, the in-
struction requires (ts a tul/,tter of law that the plaintiff 
guard himself against unexpected jcr·b. "\Vc reaffirm 
the position we took in onr brief under Point ~o. 1 and 
the authorities cited thereunder, that no ease has ever 
been brought to our attention where a court ha~ su::;tained 
a requirement that a party as a matter of law guard 
and protect himself again~t unexpected, negligently 
caused jerb. This requirement revive;; contributory 
negligenC'e and ass~.:.rdption of ri~k as dcl'enses under the 
Fedcntl Employers' Liability Act. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY MISCONCEIVED 
THE MEANING OF INSTRUCTIOK KO. 19, AND LABOR-
ING U~DER SUCH .\iiSCONCEPTION HAS 1?\!CORRECTLY 
HELD THAT SAID INSTRUCTIOK WAS PROPER. 
This ·Court, dio;C'ussing Instruction X o. 19, states: 
''Rather, that instruction told them that the 
jarring must have been unexpectedly ur llllneceo;-
sarily severe. Had U1e jarring been of the type 
or :;;everity usually expected in a stop, and if SllCh 
stop was 110t unexpected, then, of course, under 
the circumstances of this ca:;;e, respondent could 
not have been negligent in any particular." 
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Imtruction No. 19 actual\~ ~j ates in part: 
"The plaintiff cannot ,.,., reeover u~ unless 
he prove~ **" an unexpected jarring or jerking of 
unusual and unnecessary severity "u." 
'l'he difference between unexpected or unuMally 
severe, and an unexpected jerking of unusual severity 
is the differeMe between a li.on and a fish. The foiT!ler, 
in the disjunctive, allows recovery for an unexpected 
jerk and also !'or an unneeessarily severe jerk. The latter 
allows recovery only for a jerk that is both unexpected 
and unusually severe. Thi6 Court has begged the very 
question raised on our appeal and has misa.nalyzed the 
case of A~-re~ v. Fnion Pacific in the process. 1t is obvi-
ous under the authori.ties cited in our brief that the plain-
tiff slwuld have been allowed to recover if tile jerk vras 
not reasonably to be expected, and that plaintiff should 
have been allowed to recover if the jerk was unnecessar-
ily severe. These are two separate and distinct proposi-
tions, yet thPy were combined and the requirement of 
both imposed by Instruction Xo.l9. This Court';: opinion 
would make it appear that said instruction allowed 
n•eovcry for either eventuality. Instruction X o. 19 by use 
of the words "unexpected jarring or jerking of unuslllll 
or unneces~ary ~Pworit~·'' plarE";o. an added burden of proof 
on plaintiff's shoulder~. There i:> no \\"UY of determining 
1 hat. the jury, in a general wrdict, found against plaintiff 
on UotiL the is~ue of unexpectednPS"- and unnece~~ar)' 
violcnee. 'l'hry could han• been for plaintiff on one or 
!he other of thr>'l' i,:;~ur:> and plaintiff would still have 
lost \uHler Instrudion No.19. 
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CONCLUSION 
The basic thing about which we complain i~ that this 
Court has not met the issues raised by plaintiff's appeal. 
With regard to Point I, \VC concede that Instruction 
:-.To. 12 was proper. "\Ve requested the instruction. But 
it lost its meaning in the light of inronsistent and erron-
eous instruetions }Jo, 20 and 23. How anyone could read 
theo:e instructions and not realize that plaintiff had been 
deprived of the issue of whether t.he stop should have 
been made at all we cannot underf'.tand. \Ve sjuccrely 
and respectfully hope that this Court will reappraise 
this issue. 
\Yith regard to Point IT we suggest that the opinion 
stems from a misconception of Instruetion .:Jo. :!6. A 
duty to exercise reasonable care and an absolute duty 
are widely different things. An absolute duty to expect 
the unexpected und a duty to exercise reasonable can; in 
expecting the unexpected are tvw different things. Im-
agine a milroad 1·ule requiring a man to expect the un-
expected being approved by thi~ Court as a rule of law! 
1\'e can only hopc with all due !Jumility that thi~ Court 
will review and correct this obviom error. 
\Vith regard to Point TTT we ean only reiterate that 
to require plaintiff to prove both an unexpected and an 
unusually violent jerk flies in the very teeth of the liberal 
philosophy ol' the United States Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Ad, see 
Rogers v. Mis.~ouri Pac. Ry. C{)., 77 S. Ct. 443, 3:J2 U.S. 
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500, and also this Court's heretofore unassailable opinion 
in the case of Ayres 1!. The Uniotl Pacific Railroad Com-
patty, 111 Utah 104,176 P. 2d 161. 
We respectfully petition this Honorable Court for 
a rehearing on the vital issues herein presented. 
Respectfully submitted, 
, 
I 
i 
.) 
RA \VUNGS, WALLACE, J,· 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
By: Wayne L. Black 
Counsel for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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